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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Empirical research usually finds optimal hedge ratios close to one (Ederington; 
Howard and D'Antonio; Kolb and Okunev; Mathews and Holthausen; Peck). Recently, 
Lapan and Moschini added basis and yield risk and found lower, but still high, optimal 
hedge ratios. The reality is that producers hedge much less. The theoretical and empirical 
models used in past research have made simplifying assumptions that restrict them from 
explaining what farmers actually do. In a sample of 539 Kansas farmers, Schroeder and 
Goodwin found that, depending upon the crop, only 2% to 10% of the producers raising 
crops hedged. Tomek argues the hedge ratio is overestimated due to omission of 
important costs from the specification of farmers' objective function (i.e. yield risk and 
transaction costs). Lenee finds that under realistic conditions the optimal hedging strategy 
is sitnply not to hedge. Shapiro and Brorsen found that next to income stability (i.e., low 
income variability), the most important factor explaining the use of futures markets is the 
individual's debt position. An appropriate model might be one in which the farmer's debt 
position is accounted for in the model. The model should make explicit distinction 
between a low-leveraged farmer who has little financial risk, and may have no need to 
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hedge, and a high-leveraged farmer who would hedge more because of his/her higher 
expected bankruptcy and liquidity costs. 
Firms are normally assumed risk averse. However, empirical evidence shows that 
risk preferences are not significantly related to hedging (Shapiro and Brorsen). Schroeder 
and Goodwin found that risk preferences of crop producers did not influence forward 
pricing. Williams, Smith and Stutz, and Brnrsen show that risk aversion is not necessary 
for firms to hedge. Rather than assuming risk aversion, this study assumes that incentives 
exist to maximize firm's equity. The objective function is concave for reasons other than 
risk aversion. The model allows interest rates to vary according to the probability of 
bankruptcy, accounts for the trade off between the tax-reducing benefits of hedging and 
the cost of hedging, and also allows hedging to be a source of meeting cash flow 
requirements. It is shown that progressive tax rates are an important incentive to hedge 
when the firm is not close to bankruptcy. As Smith and Stutz argue, tax-reducing benefits 
of hedging become more significant as the function yielding the after-tax income becomes 
more concave. The model presented here will allow debt, and therefore leverage, to be 
determined endogenously. 
It has been widely accepted that output and price risk should be considered 
together when estimating optimal hedge ratios. Yet few studies have considered both. 
Exceptions are Chavas and Pope, Grant, Lapan and Moschini, Losq, and Rolfo. Also, 
little has been done to incorporate financial risk into optimal hedge models. Schroeder 
and Goodwin found that leverage was positively related with forward pricing, and Harris 
and Baker's survey indicates that hedging increases a farmer's loan limits. Turvey and 
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Baker argue that hedging reduces th~ expected liquidity cost. Brorsen develops a theory 
where interest rates are a nonlinear function of initial wealth, debt, and the variability of 
ending wealth. The new theoretical model explicitly allows hedging to reduce 
bankruptcy and liquidity costs and tax liabilities. Also, the nonlinear interest rate function 
is estimated within the model by determining the expected bankruptcy losses to debt 
holders. This makes the model easier to estimate empirically. 
General Objective 
The general objective of this study is to derive a new theoretical model of hedging to 
determine the relative importance of factors that influence farmer's hedging behavior. 
Specific Objective 
To determine optimal hedge ratios for a wheat and stocker steer producer and their 
relationship with yield risk, price variability, basis risk, and financial risk, using alternative 
assumptions about the value of the parameters. 
Procedures 
An empirical example is provided to show how changes in assumptions affect optimal 
hedge ratios for a wheat and stocker steer producer. Because of the complexity of the 
analytical model, no comparative statics can be derived. Therefore, the effects of various 
factors are determined numerically for a specific example. The factors considered are: 
variance of both cash and futures prices, basis risk, yield variance, progressive tax rates, 
cost of hedging, liquidity cost, off farm income and dynamics. Also, simulations are run to 
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test the sensitivity of the optimal hedge ratio to changes in the distributional assumption of 
yields and prices, the randomness of output, and the inclusion of tax carry back. Reaction 
functions are used to determine an optimum dynamic hedging strategy. These functions 
are called reaction functions because they enable. the decision maker to react to 
information prevailing at the time decisions are made. Hedging for the period is a function 
of random variables realized in the previous period (Venkateswaran and Preckel). The 
objective function could not be integrated analytically and, therefore, Monte Carlo 
integration is used. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORY 
The theory chapter is divided into two parts. In the first section entitled theoretical 
background, the existing theory of hedging is reviewed. In the second part, a new theory 
of hedging is developed. 
Theoretical Background 
Model of Johnson and Stein 
The model of Johnson and Stein has been used widely. This model assumes that 
decision makers minimize the variance of farm's income, assuming no budget constraints, 
no imputed interest cost and no brokerage commission. Let Y and F be respectively, the 
number of units of cash commodity and of futures contract held, P; the uncertain cash 
price at future time T, P0c the initial cash price, P{ the uncertain futures price at future 
time T, and P [ the initial futures price. The uncertain profit of the hedger who holds Y 
units of the commodity and hedges F futures contracts is: 
(2.1) TI = ( p; - p oc) y + ( p { - p [) F 
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where (P; - P 0c) is the random price change per unit of commodity and (P { - P [) is the 
random price change in the futures contract. 
The minimum-variance hedge (MVH) ratio is the hedge that minimizes the 
variance of profit (2.1). The variance of profit is: 
(2.2) 
Where o!, is the variance of the cash price, op1 is the variance of the futures price, and 
oP•J>f is the covariance between the cash and the futures price. Taking the derivative of 
(2.2) with respect to the futures contracts F and setting it equal to zero, we obtain 
(2.3) 
Then the MVH ratio (F* IY) is: 
(2.4) 
F· Op°.}'/ 
=---y 2 
op, 
which depends on the covariance between the cash and the futures price relative to the 
variance of the futures price. 
Commonly, the MVH ratio is estimated with ordinary least squares (i.e., Elam; 
Ederington; Heifner; Carter and Lyons; Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha; Franckle). The 
optimal hedge ratio (op°J'/ o!,) is the slope coefficient when the cash price change 
(!:iP/ =P/-P,~1) is regressed against the futures price change(!:iP; =P{-P/1) 
(2.5) 
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Data used have been both price levels and price changes, but in most studies price change 
data are used to reduce statistical problems (Blank; Brown). The intercept in (2.5) 
represents the basis when the futures market is unbiased (E(aP/) =0), the expected 
value of the error term is zero (E( e,) =O), and convergence holds (E(P,c) =P{1 ) 
(assuming the commodity is deliverable and is held to maturity). To see this, take the 
expected value of (2.5): 
(2.6) 
where (P,:1 -P,:1 ) represents the basis. The error term reflects the basis risk, which is the 
random fluctuation in the difference between the cash market price and the futures 
contract price. This risk is not eliminated by hedging. 
The shortcomings of the MVH ratio are that the agent is assumed (implicitly or 
explicitly) to have a quadratic utility function (or profits are distributed normally) and that 
the determined hedge ratio is not an optimal hedge ratio, but rather one which minimized 
the variance of the producer's income. Even when the producer is assumed to have a 
quadratic utility function, there is no reason to believe that the utility will be maximized 
when the variance of the spot-futures position is minimized (Benninga, Eldor and Zilcha). 
Variance minimization in the context of the expected-utility maximization is 
equivalent to infinite risk aversion. Infinite risk aversion is unrealistic since, for example, 
there is an intrinsic contradiction in having infinitely risk-averse agents holding risky cash 
positions. 
Benninga, Eldor, and Zilcha, cited by Lenee, show the conditions under which 
MVH would be consistent with expected utility-maximizing hedge ratios. The basic 
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assumptions are that (i) the decision maker is not allowed to borrow, lend, or invest in 
alternative activities, (ii) there are neither safety margins nor futures brokerage fees, (iii) 
production is deterministic, (iv) random cash prices can be expressed as a linear function 
of futures prices plus an independent error term, and (v) futures prices are unbiased 
( E( fl. P /) = 0) . All assumptions, except for assumption ( v) are relaxed in this study. 
The Mean-Variance Approach 
The mean variance approach has been used extensively in the literature to 
determine the optimal hedge ratio (Peck; Kahl; Bond and Thompson; Chavas and Pope; 
Berck; Karp; Levy; etc). The model presented to illustrate the mean-variance approach 
is similar to the model of Feder, Just and Schmitz; Danthine; and Holthausen (Robinson 
and Barry). These authors incorporate the possibility of buying and selling futures into 
the model of the competitive firm under price uncertainty developed by Sandmo, and 
Batra and Ullah. In this model, the production decision and the decision to trade are 
choice variables. Output is assumed non random, and they do not impose efficient 
markets (E(P/) *-P[); i.e., implicitly allowing for transaction costs. The objective of the 
producer is to maximize his/her utility of profits. Define profit as: 
(2.7) 
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where rr, Y, P, F, and Phave been defined above. C(J') is variable cost, where C 1(Y)>O 
and C"(Y)>O, and fixed costs areB. Note that there is neither production nor basis risk 
in this model. The expected profit (E(rr)) and variance of profits (V(rr)) are: 
E(1t)=Pc(Y-F) +PfF-C(Y)-B 
(2.8) 
a;=(Y-F)2 a;c 
where Pc =E(P c). The certainly equivalent model can be now formulated as: 
(2.9) 
where}.. is a constant risk attitude measure. Substituting (2.8) into (2.9) yields: 
(2.10) 
Differentiate (2.10) with respect to Y and F to find the optimal output and the optimal 
amount to hedge: 
a1t - . 
a~E =Pc-:-C1(Y)-}..(Y-F)o!c=O 
(2.11) 
arcCE -c f. 2 
--=-P +P +}..(Y-F)o =O aF pc 
Adding the two expressions, one finds the solution for Y: 
(2.12) pi-C'(Y)=O 
This indicates that the firm should produce up to the point where marginal cost equals the 
futures price. This makes sense in the absence of basis risk. Cash price variability is, 
therefore, eliminated through hedging. The firm behaves as if there is no risk involved, 
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and the decision to produce does not depend on the level of risk aversion (A.). The 
optimal condition in (2.12) no longer holds when output is uncertain and correlated with 
the spot price (Grant). 
The optimal hedge from (2.11) is 
(2.13) 
which shows how the firm would hedge more the more risk averse it is. Under the 
assumption of no basis risk and efficient markets, the decision maker will hedge all that is 
produced (Peck). 
One drawback of the E-V framework is that it assumes the farmer's expected 
utility is a function only of expected income and variance of income. This implies that the 
utility function is quadratic ( or that income is normally distributed), and that risk aversion 
increases with wealth. Both assumptions are unrealistic. 
Yield Risk 
Farmers face both price and output uncertainty, yet few studies have considered 
both factors. Lenee and Tomek argue that one of the most important restrictions of the 
minimum-variance hedge ratios seems to.be that production is deterministic (the other 
important restriction is that there are no alternative investments). Little participation of 
farmers in the futures markets can be in part explained by the fact that farmers cannot 
adequately forecast the size of the harvest even after all production decisions have been 
made (Rolfo ). Chavas and Pope and Lapan and Moschini assumed production risk is 
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multiplicative, and found that production and hedging decisions may be affected by the 
spot price. Recall from (2.11) that production was not affected by the spot price. Under 
-
production certainty and basis risk, the higher the cash price, the less the firm will hedge. 
Chavas and Pope and Grant could not, however, determine the effect of output price, 
price risk or risk aversion on hedging under production risk. When production uncertainty 
was assumed additive rather than multiplicative (Robinson and Barry}, neither the spot 
price nor the risk factor affects production decisions. 
Production risk provides an additional explanation of optimal hedge ratios being 
below unity (Rolfo; Chavas and Pope; Lapan and Moschini; Losq). Lenee concludes that 
stochastic production reduces significantly both optimal hedges and zero-hedging 
opportunity costs. Also, the optimal hedge is a decreasing function of the variance of the 
production disturbance (Lapan and Moschini, Lenee). With the exception of Lenee, 
most studies assume yields are normally distributed even though crop yields are known to 
fall in the range from O to a maximum possible value and crop yield distributions might be 
significantly skewed either to the right or to the left (Nelson and Preckel). In this study 
yields and animal weight follow a beta distribution. The disadvantage of this is that yields 
are not correlated with prices . This is because of the difficulty to correlate a beta random 
variable with prices that follow a lognormal distribution. 
Output Assumed as Given 
There is some concern in the literature on whether the risk parameter affects the 
decision to hedge (Berck). Peck concludes that the optimal hedge ratio depends on the 
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individual's risk attitudes when the cash position is assumed as given so that optimal cash 
and futures positions are not determined simultaneously. However, Kahl does not 
assume the cash position as given and argues that the optimal hedge ratio is independent 
of the individual's risk aversion. Berck finds that the simultaneous choice of crops and 
futures has a large effect on the amount of hedging. When including a nonlinear cost of 
storage in the expected cash market return, Bond and Thompson found that the optimal 
hedge ratio does depend on the risk parameter. In a more recent study, Lapan and 
Moschini found that the expected utility maximizing hedge ratio, in contrast with the 
mean-variance solution, does depend on risk attitudes. 
This study assumes resource constraints and limited choices. By fixing output to 
a certain level, the only choice variables in the model are how much to hedge and the level 
of debt so that one can better determine the sensitivity of the optimal hedge ratio given 
changes in a certain parameter. 
Basis Risk 
Hedging eliminates risk as long as fluctuations of cash and futures prices are 
perfectly correlated and no financial and production risk exist. In practice, these prices are 
not perfectly correlated, so that a new risk associated with hedging, called basis risk, must 
be considered (Robinson and Barry). In Working's view, hedgers place a hedge if they 
believe that futures prices reflect an attractive profit opportunity when compared to the 
spot price. The size of the basis at the time of hedge initiation, influences the decision to 
hedge or not (Castelino; Peck). A hedger presumably has no intention to deliver since 
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actual delivery from a given area to another location may be difficult or the contract is 
cash settled so it is not possible to deliver on it (i.e., feeder contract), and the basis (the 
difference between the cash and the futures prices) may not be zero. This situation is 
easily handled by including in the analytical model the basis price (Peck). 
Basis risk has a significant effect on the minimum-variance hedge ratio (Castelino ). 
If basis risk is zero (assuming futures markets are unbiased and output is certain), then the 
minimum-variance hedge ratio is one, but if basis risk exists, the minimum-variance hedge 
ratio will not be one (Castelino ). Robinson and Barry, based on previous developments 
by Johnson, Ward and Fletcher, Heifner, Peck, and Kahl, derived the optimal hedge ratio 
assuming output certainty and basis risk in the context of the certainty equivalent model. 
Results indicated that the optimal hedge ratio depends on the expected returns and 
variances for the cash and futures positions, as well as on the correlation of returns from 
these positions. However, no conclusions were drawn as to what the relationship between 
the optimal hedge ratio and basis risk is. Lapan and Moschini found that basis risk does 
not by itself affect the optimal hedge. When both basis and production risk are present, 
the analysis is complicated because of the interaction between the two effects; however, 
the authors conclude that an increase in pure basis risk will increase the optimal futures 
hedge assuming the regression coefficient of yield on futures price is negative ( the authors 
assumed away the possible effect of the cash price on output). This contradicts what one 
would expect since the higher the basis risk the less effective the hedge becomes. As 
Castelino points out, the hedge ratio should be reduced in response to increasing basis 
risk. 
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Leverage and Taxes 
According to Turvey, there are at least two possible explanations for why hedging 
increases with debt. The first is that hedging decreases financial risk (i.e. leverage) and the 
second is that hedging reduces liquidity risk. Another reason, that is going to be very 
important in explaining the findings in this paper, is the tax-reducing benefits of hedging. 
It is possible to find a debt-equity mix that maximizes the market value of the firm 
(or that maximizes utility, for our purposes) since interest charges are tax deductible, and 
a tax advantage to debt exists (Hirshleifer). If there are significant "leverage-related" 
costs, such as bankruptcy costs and interest rates, then there exist a trade off between 
these costs and the tax advantage of debt (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim). Several researchers 
have developed models that capture the trade off between the tax advantage of debt and 
the debt-related costs (i.e., interests, cost of bankruptcy) (Kraus and Litzenberger; Kim; 
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim). In these models, it is argued that if the firm can pay its current 
liabilities, financial leverage decrease the firm's income tax liability and increases its after-
tax operating earnings. Smith and Stulz incorporate hedging and conclude that: (i) 
hedging reduces the variability of pre-tax firm values, which in tum reduces the expected 
tax liability, increasing the expected post-value of the firm; and (ii) hedging benefits 
shareholders by reducing the expected transaction costs of bankruptcy and increasing the 
expected after-tax firm value net of bankruptcy costs. These models, though, do not 
incorporate progressive tax rates, like the U.S. tax code. This is important since the tax-
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reducing benefits of hedging may increase if the function that yields after-tax income 
becomes more concave (Smith and Stulz). 
Several authors (Brorsen; Lenee; Turvey; Turvey and Baker) have found that 
hedging increases with leverage. However, these models do not incorporate any tax 
structure. In Brorsen's model, interest rates are a nonlinear function of initial wealth, 
debt, and the variability of ending wealth. However, the ability of hedging to reduce 
bankruptcy costs, liquidity costs and tax liabilities are not incorporated in Brorse11' s 
model. The new theoretical model developed in this study also incorporates a nonlinear 
interest rate function, but this function is estimated differently by determining the 
expected bankruptcy losses to debt holders. This makes the model easier to estimate 
empirically as will be shown later. 
Liquidity is the motivation for farmers' use of futures in Turvey, and Turvey and 
Baker's model. Where liquidity refers to the farm's capacity to generate sufficient cash to 
meet financial commitments when they occur. With variable yields and prices, the ability 
of farms to generate these funds is not certain (Turvey and Baker). The cash flow derived 
from hedging is the difference between the net price received with the hedge in place and 
the cash price which would have been received without the hedge. High debt farms are 
more likely to have liquidity constraints and would hedge more. The probability of cash 
flows falling bellow a critical level decreases as hedging increases (Turvey). Turvey and 
Turvey and Baker include liquidity cost when firms have to sell off long-term assets to 
cover losses. 
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The optimal hedge ratio is also an increasing function of debt in Lenee's model 
because agents use debt to enlarge their holdings of the alternative investment. This is 
only true when returns in futures are positively correlated with returns on the alternative 
investment. An alternative investment increases risk, and this risk can be partly offset by 
additional hedging. 
The Model 
Assume that because of unpredictable conditions (i.e., weather variability), the decision 
maker cannot predict output with certainty at the time of the production decision. The 
technology of the firm can then be represented by the stochastic production function: 
(2.14) 
where y, is an a-dimensional vector of production levels at time t (letting t = I be the 
harvest time and t-1 the time where decisions are made),/is an increasing function of 
K1-1 and X1-i· Where X1-1 and K,_1 are respectively vectors of variable inputs and capital 
assets, and E11 is an n x I vector of error terms. 
Assume a competitive producer whose only available hedging instrument is a 
futures contract. Let F,_1 be an n-dimensional vector of the amounts hedged in the futures 
market. For each unit of F1-i, the firm makes (P/-1 ~Pf), the difference between the 
selling and the buying prices of the futures contracts. In the cash market, the firm makes 
(Pf+ b ,) dollars for each unit of output sold, where the basis (b,) is the difference between 
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the cash price (P, c) and the futures price at harvest (P{) . The firm's variable costs consist 
of the cost of inputs (P,~~X,_1), the cost of hedging (h,~1 F,_1), interest on debt (i1D1), 
and depreciation (aK,_1), where P,~1 is a vector ofinput prices, ht is the cost of hedging, 
i, is the interest rate, D 1 is total liabilities, and a is a (constant) rate of depreciation. The 
firm's profit at time t ( 1tJ can then be represented by 
(2.15) 
-ipr-a.K,-1-YL, 
A liquidity fee (yL,) has been included in (2.15) to account for situations when the firm 
cannot honor its current obligations; where y is a liquidity fee rate, and L1 is the portion of 
current liabilities that the firm could not pay when liquid capital was not available. As 
assumed by Turvey and Baker, firms incur liquidity costs when they must sell off long-
term assets to cover losses. Taxable income (T/1) can be obtained by subtracting the 
corresponding standard deductions (STD) and exemptions (EXM) from (2.15) 
( T/1 = 1t1 - STD - EXM). Note that because all payments to debt claims are assumed to be 
tax deductible, interest is subtracted in (2.15). Total liabilities (D,) subject to interest 
charges can be determined by computing the liabilities from the previous period, plus the 
capital needed to finance inputs, hedging costs (margin calls are also included here), and 
investment, minus current assets from period t- 1 (CA,.1), minus any payment made to the 
principal in period t - 1 (A 1•1) 
(2.16) x 1 I D 1 =D1_1 +P,_1)(,_1 +h,_1F,_1 +(K,-K,_1)-CA,_1 -A,_1 
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where (K, -K,_1) is capital investment. 
Denote r(_T!,) as the firm's income tax rate, which is an increasing function of 
taxable income ( TI,); therefore, net income (NI,) or after tax income is 
(2.17) NII= 1tt; 
-w,-1; 
TI1>0 
1t1<0 
1t1<-W,-1 
indicating that taxes are zero whenever taxable income is negative, and net income can be 
negative whenever profits are negative, but its absolute value cannot be less than 
beginning equity (i.e., the firm cannot lose more capital than it has available). 
The firm's current assets (CA,) are the cash flow after the cash and the futures 
positions have been settled, assuming the decision maker does not keep any inventory. 
Current assets equal initial current assets (CA,_1), plus net income (NJ,), plus depreciation 
(aK,_1), plus any long term capital borrowed in period t (LID, -LID,_), minus 
investment (K, -K,_1), and minus any payment made to the principal (A,_1): 
(2.18) 
CA,= CA,_1 +NJ,+ <XK,_1 + (LTD, -LTD,_1) 
- (K, - K,_1) -At-1 - Lt-1 
In (2.18), depreciation is added back because it is not really a cash outflow for the firm, 
and L1_1 is the portion of current liabilities that could not be paid in the previous period. 
Assume that the farmer borrows money whenever current assets minus current expenses 
are not enough to pay the capital investment needed at time period t. Therefore long term 
18 
debt (LTD,) is defined as debt carried from previous period (LTD,_1), plus 
investment (K, - K,_1), minus amortizations (A,_1) minus any current assets available after 
paying variable cost(P/'X, +h:F,): 
(2.19) LTD= t 
LTD,_1 +(K1 -K,_1)-A,_1 -(CA1_1 -P/X1 +h/F1); 
CA,_ 1 > P,»X, +h/F, 
The level of current assets (CA,) in (2.18) must be positive, otherwise the firm would not 
have liquid capital to pay current liabilities. Assume debt holders charge a fee ( yL1) 
whenever the firm does not have enough liquid capital to pay its current liabilities. Notice 
that if the negative of (2.18) is positive, this amount corresponds to the portion of current 
liabilities that could not be paid in the present period (L,): 
L, =L,_1 + A,_1 - [CA,_ 1 +NI,+ aKt-1 
(2.20) 
+ (LTD, - LTD,_1)-(K, -Kt-1)] 
As stated in (2.15), a liquidity fee equal to y L, would be subtracted from profits 
whenever (2.20) is positive. 
Let us now further define some of the variables introduced so far in the model. 
The decision maker knows at time t - I the vector of futures prices (P/-1), the price 
vector of inputs (P,~1) and the cost of selling in the futures market (hr). However, 
because of production lags the farmer does not know with certainty the vector of output 
prices in the cash market (P, c), or the futures price at harvest (P{). 
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The random variables, (P{) and (P, c), can be defined as following a random walk 
(2.21) 
Pf-pc +o t - t-1 ""3t 
where e21 and e31 are correlated vectors of mean zero errors. 
The firm's net worth would be net income plus beginning equity: 
(2.22) W, =NI,+ W,_ 1 
Since the firm cannot lose more capital than it has available, ending wealth ('Wi) must be 
positive and net income is bounded to be greater than the negative of beginning equity 
(NI,> - W,_ 1). Note that the firm will be bankrupt when profits are negative and less than 
the negative ofinitial wealth (n, < -W,_1). Also note that when profits are equal to the 
negative of initial wealth ( n, = -W,_ 1), net income equals initial wealth (NI,= - W1_ 1) 
(2.17) and the firm will be at the boundary of going bankrupt (i.e., W, = 0) (2.22). When 
(W, = 0) and the amount (W,_ 1 - n,) is positive, the firm is bankrupt and the losses to debt 
holders (LS,) are: 
(2.23) LS,= C(D,) + W1_1 -n,; 1t1 <- W,_ 1 
where C(D,), the bankruptcy fee, is an increasing function of the debt level (2.16). 
Farmers face risk (i.e., yield risk, basis risk, price risk); therefore, bankruptcy is 
possible since the condition (n, < -W,_ 1) (2.17) can occur with positive probability. 
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Assuming banks are risk neutral, lenders will charge the firm a premium which would be a 
function of the expected bankruptcy losses. Hence a firm with a higher probability of 
bankruptcy would have a higher expected rate of interest on its debt than a firm with 
lower financial risk (Barry, Baker, and Sanint). In practice, interest rates can vary by as 
much as five percentage points (Turvey and Baker). It is assumed here that banks have 
enough information about the firm to calculate the expected bankruptcy losses and charge 
a premium to firms likely to go bankrupt. The firm's expected interest rate on debt (i1) will 
then equal the prime interest rate (r*) plus a premium (PR,) 
(2.24) i,=r* +PR, 
where the prime interest rate (r j is assumed constant over time. 
Given the bankruptcy losses (LS,) in (2.23), the premium (PR,) can be defined as 
the expected ratio of the losses to total liabilities (LS/D,): 
(2.25) 
where I[.] is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the firm goes bankrupt and 
zero otherwise. j(Eu,E2.,E3i) is the probability density function of the error terms defined 
in equations (2.14) and (2.21). The premium (PR,) at time t would be zero if the 
probability of the firm going bankrupt is zero so that the ratio of losses (LS,) to the debt 
level (D,) equals zero. 
Assume that the hedger aims to maximize the expected net present worth ( W,), 
given the expected interest rate (2.24) and the non bankruptcy condition (1t1> - W,_ 1), 
yielding the objective function: 
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n 
(2.26) 
max ;[W,] = W0 +~ff f ptNI,f[1t1>-W,_1] 
I 
where P' is the discount factor(O>pt<I), and W0 is the exogenous initial wealth. Notice 
that the model is dynamic, and it is defined for n production periods. In (2.26), when net 
worth ( 1t, < -W,_ 1) is negative, W1 will equal zero, indicating that equity holders get 
nothing if the firm enters bankruptcy. At t- I , the farmer has already decided the input 
levels (Xt_1), the level of capital (:Ki_1) and the level of output. The only choice variable is 
how much to hedge (F,). The debt level is determined by (2.16), and it will change as 
beginning equity changes. 
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CHAPTER ID 
DATA AND PROCEDURES 
Because of the complexity of the analytical model (2.26), no comparative statics 
results were derived. Therefore, the effects of various factors are determined numerically 
for a specific example. Simulations are performed for a wheat and stocker steer producer. 
The model is simulated assuming constant returns to scale production and a single period. 
Also, government programs for wheat are not included to simplify the model and because 
the future of government programs is uncertain. The producer has made the decision to 
produce I 000 acres of wheat, and graze 296 steers on the winter wheat pasture. The 
wheat is planted in September and harvested in June, and the farmer buys steer calves in 
October and sells them in March. The only decision left to make is how much of the 
expected output of wheat and steers should be hedged in the futures market. The data for 
the base model is set forth in table 3.1. 
The amount of capital borrowed in (2.16) will be dependent on the cost of hedging 
which depends on the amount hedged in the futures market and on beginning current 
assets (CA,_1). There is only one investment made at period O (k0), so that long term debt 
in (2.19) for period t-1 was defined as: 
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Table 3.1. Wheat for Grain, Owned Harvest Equipment, Budget 
Per Acre and Stocker Steers on Wheat Pasture 
Cost/Returns Per Head• 
Variable 
Wheat 
Variable Cost 
Capital investment 
Yield 
Cash price 
Futures price at planting 
Futures price at harvest 
Cost of hedging 
Steers 
Variable Cost 
Capital investment 
Steers calf Weight 
Sale weight 
Price of steers calves 
Cash price 
Futures price at planting 
Futures price at harvest 
Cost of hedging 
Other Variables 
Bankruptcy fee 
Interest rate 
Units 
$/acre 
$/acre 
Bu./acre 
$/bu. 
$/bu. 
$/bu. 
$/bu. 
$/head 
$/head 
cwt 
cwt 
cwt 
$/cwt 
$/cwt 
$/cwt 
$/cwt 
% 
% 
Value 
78.32 
171.47 
35.00 
2.90 
3.20 
3.20 
0.02c: 
70.87. 
29.09 
4.36 
6.65 
92.00 
82.00 
85.00 
85.00 
0.25 
30.00 
8.50 
Standard 
Deviation 
5.00b 
0.55 
0.50 
0.50d 
5.5oe 
5.00 
• The costs for production were taken from the OSU Enterprise Budgets developed by 
Oklahoma State University, Department of Agricultmal Economics. 
b Source: Schroeder and Goodwin 
c Source: Brorsen, Coombs and Anderson 
d Source: Koontz and Trapp 
• Source: USDA. Calculated as the Standard Deviation of the cash price changes 
from October to march, 1980-1991. 
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(3.1) 
Assume the farmer will pay the long-term debt in seven payments of equal amount, so A, 
in (2.15) is: 
(3.2) LTDO A=--
1 7 
and outstanding debt subject to interest payments in period t is: 
(3.3) LTD, =LTD0 -(t- l)A,_ 1 
Simulations are first performed by changing initial wealth (W0) and solving for the optimal 
hedge ratio F, in (2.26). Then initial wealth (W0) is set at $150,000 ( ending debt to assets 
ratio is approximately 0.61), and numerical derivatives were used to obtain the response of 
the optimal hedge ratio to variations in the parameters of the model. The parameters to 
be changed in the model are: variance of both cash and futures price, basis risk, yield 
variance, tax rate, cost of hedging, liquidity cost and off farm income. Also, simulations 
are run to test the sensitivity of the optimal hedge ratio to changes in the distributional 
assumption of yields and prices, the randomness of output, and the inclusion of tax carry 
back. 
Monte Carlo Integration 
Equations (2.24) and (2.25) cannot be integrated analytically, therefore Monte 
Carlo Integration was used. Assume ctt in (2.14), € 21 and c3, in (2.21) are distributed 
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with probability density functions beta( € 11) , lognormal( Eu) , and lognormal( €31) 
respectively. A total of s random numbers for yields (2.14) (y1,, Yu, ... , Ys1) were 
generated from a beta distribution. Cash and futures prices in (2.21) were generated from 
a lognormal distribution: (P1:,P2:, ... ,Ps;) and (Pfr,P{,, ... ,P!,); wheres is the sample size 
equal to 500. Profits (rtit(yil'PiJc,Pf)) in (2.14), total debt in (2.15) (Dit(yu,P;,Pf)), net 
income in (2.17) (Nlit(yil'P;,Pf)) and bankruptcy losses in (2.20) were then define as 
functions of the random numbers for yields and prices. The risk premium (2.25) and the 
objective function (2.26) were approximated by: 
(3.4) 
n· s 
LI: WN!it(yiJ,P:,Pt)[rtit>~t-t] 
maxE[Wt] = Wo + t=I i=I , 
~ s 
where the discounting factor is W = 1 The model was solved to obtain the 
(1 +0.085)' 
optimal hedge ratio (F,) by means of the nonlinear algorithm in GAMS (Brooke, Kendrik, 
and Meeraus), which uses analytical derivatives. 
Beta Random Numbers 
Assume that wheat yields and the sale weight of the animals follow a beta 
distribution with mean and standard deviations shown in table 3 .1. Crop yields may be 
distributed as a beta random variable since crop yields are known to fall in a range from 0 
to some maximum possible value, and crop yields distributions might be significantly 
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skewed either to the right or the left (Nelson and Preckel). The beta distributions were 
generated by first drawing two independent samples from a Gamma distribution using the 
Phillips generator (Shannon, p.365). These two samples are then used to get beta random 
numbers (Naylor). 
The beta density function is a two-parameter density function defined over the 
closed interval O ~y~ I. However, the beta density function can be defined on the interval 
c ~y * ~ d by using the following transformation (Mendenhall, Wackerly and Scheaffer): 
(3.5) 
where, c and dare respectively the lower and upper bound of the variable y •. If y is a 
beta-distributed random variable with parameters ct and p, then the expected value of y 
(E(y)) and variance of y (V(y)) are respectively: 
(3.6) E(y) = _ct_; V(y) = ct p 
ct+P (ct+P)2(ct+P+l) 
A beta distributed variable is a function of two gamma variables, g1(ct,o) and (g1(ct,o) + 
gz<p,o)). Where ct, Pando are the parameters that define the gamma random variables. 
Variables gi(ct,o) and gz(p,o) are both independent gamma variables with identical values 
of o and parameters ct and P respectively (Naylor). The Phillips generator (Appendix? 
lines??) described in detail by Shannon (p. 365) was used to generate gamma random 
numbers . As an example, the following steps were used to generate the beta random 
numbers for wheat yield: 
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Wheat yields were assumed to be in the closed interval O ~y ·;:,: 55 bu./acre, where 
E(y) = 35 and V(y) = 25 (table 3.1). Therefore, using (3.5), y * = L and 
· 55 
E(y*)= E(y) =~=0.64 
55 55 
V(y *) = V(y) = 25 = 0.0083 
552 552 
By (3. 6) one knows that 
E(y) =-a.- =0.64 
a.+p 
V(y) = a. p = 0.0083 
(a.+ P)2 ( a. + p + 1) 
The values for a. and P were obtained by solving these two equations 
simultaneously, which yields a.= 9.676, P = 17.2021 
a., p and o are needed to generate two independent gamma random variables. 
Make o =E(y)/V(y) = 35/25 = 1.4. Note that o is obtained solving simultaneously 
E(y) = a.lo; V(y) = a./o2 , which correspond, respectively, to the mean and variance 
of a gamma distributed variable. 
Using the Phillips generator, g1(a.,o) was generated with parameters a. and 
o and gi(p,o) with p and o. Finally, the beta random variable for wheat yields is 
given by: 
The same procedure was followed to generate the beta-distributed sale weights of the 
steers. 
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Lognormal Cash and Futures Prices 
If price vector Pt follows a lognormal distribution with mean 6 and variance-
covariance matrix 'P: 
P,-lognorma/(6,'P) 
then the logarithm of p, (lnp,) is distributed normally with mean µ. and variance-covariance 
matrix Q (Johnson and Kotz): 
lnP- Normal(µ.,Q) 
I 'P .. 
µ.=ln6.--ln(l+~) Vi=1· 
I I 2 2 ei 
(3.7) 'P Q =ln(l +~)· Vi=J· 
lj 2 , 
ei 
where i and j are respectively the row and column number or a given matrix. Since prices 
are assumed to follow a random walk, the mean is actually the price itself lagged one 
period (i.e., 6 = P,_1 ). To generate the lognormal random numbers the following formula 
was calculated (Naylor et al.): 
(3.8) 
where Q is the Cholesky decomposition ofQ and N(0,1) is a row vector of normal 
random numbers with mean zero and variance one. 
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This is better illustrated with an example. From table 3 .1, one knows that 
( 8 1 = 2.9) is the cash price for wheat, ( 82 = 3.2) is the futures price for wheat, 
('Pu= 0.3025) is the variance of the wheat cash price, ('¥22 = 0.25) is the variance of the 
wheat futures price, and ( 'P = p ~ ~ = o 2475) is the covariance between the wheat 
12 V ... II V ... 22 . 
cash and futures price, where ( p = 0. 90) is the correlation between the cash and futures 
price. From (3.7): 
'P 
µ 1 = In 8 1 - 0. 5 ln ( 1 + - 11 ) = 1. 04 704 e2 
I 
'¥22 µ2 = ln82 -0.5ln(l +-) = 1.15109 e2 
2 
'P 
nil =ln(l +-11 )=0.03533 
e2 
I 
'P 
0 22 =ln(l + ~) =0.02412 e2 
2 
The Cholesky decomposition of Q is then (Mapp, p. 160-163): 
Finally, series of random cash (P1) and futures (P2) prices were generated using (3.8): 
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- -
P 1 =exp(lnµ 1 +Q11 N1(0,l}+Q12Ni(O,l}) 
= exp(0.0625 +0.08703N1(0,l) +0.08703 Ni(O,l)) 
-
P2 =exp(lnµ 2 +Q22 Ni(O, 1)) =exp(0.1407 +0.1553Ni(O, I)) 
Cash and futures prices were generated assuming that futures markets are efficient 
(E(P/) =E(P{)). The mean and variance of the generated numbers were calculated to 
check whether they conform with the original numbers. 
Antithetic Variates 
Antithetic variates, among other variance-reduction techniques, is useful to 
increase precision for a given sample size. The underlying idea is to have two estimators, 
x, and x2 of an unknown parameter y, such that x, has a negative correlation with x2. The 
estimate ofy is then equal to (x1 +x2)/2 and has variance of 1/4(0; +o;) +ox .x . With 
I 2 I 2 
negative correlation, this variance is smaller than that possible when x1 and x2 were 
independent estimates (Shannon). Letting A, be uniformly distributed (used for example 
to produce a gamma random variable}, random numbers for the first half of the sample 
(A,, Ai, ... ,A812} were drawn, wheres is the sample size. Then the second half of the sample 
was calculated such that it was negatively correlated with the first half: A; = I - A; _ 512 . For 
example, A21 = I -A I if sample size was 40. To generate lognormal random variates, 
normal random variates (NlO, I)) were first generated. Then, N; = -ll;_ 512 yielded the 
negative correlated sample of normal random numbers. 
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Bankruptcy 
Handling bankruptcy requires introducing discrete variables into the model and 
makes the problem difficult to solve. A dummy variable is needed to let the program 
know when the firm is bankrupt so that the firm will not generate more income and would 
have to pay a bankruptcy fee. To get around,discrete variables, a differentiable 0-1 
variable is necessary. Let the bankruptcy-dummy variable Z1 be equal one when the firm is 
bankrupt ( equity ( W, = 0)) and zero otherwise ( W, > 0) . Define Z, as: 
(3.9) 
where Mis a large number. Notice that when the firm is bankrupt (W, = 0), and Zr= 1 . 
On the other hand, whenever the firm is not bankrupt (W,>O), the program will be 
calculating the exponential of a large negative number which makes z, = 0 . Therefore; the 
only possible values for Z, are one and zero, given that Mis large enough and w; is greater 
or equal to zero. 
Even though equity (w;) is restricted to be positive, GAMS would allow W, to be 
negative while reaching the optimal solution. If w; becomes negative, Z, would approach 
infinity and the program will fail to converge. To get around this problem, Z, in (I) were 
restricted to be less than exp( 1) : 
(3.10) 
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This formula works the same way as (3.9), except that Z, would not be allowed to be 
greater than exp( 1 ), and the computer will continue solving even when equity goes 
negative. For example, if (Wr = -1), then: 
Z1 =exp[l-0.5(V(l-M)~+l-M)]=exp[l-0.5(M-1 +1-M)]=exp(l) 
Assume the firm goes bankrupt in period one and Z1 = 1 . The firm's equity level is then: 
In the event of bankruptcy at period one, equity will be zero in both the first and second 
period. The bankruptcy fee is then calculated as: 
Progressive Tax Rates 
Assume the farmer is married with two children. According to the 1994 
instructions of tax form 1040 (Internal Revenue Service (IRS)), the standard deductions 
equal $9800 ($2400 for each) and total exemptions equal $3175. These quantities are 
subtracted from profits (1r1) to get taxable income (Tl;). To calculate the tax, Schedule y-2 
(IRS) for married filling separately ( table 3 .1) was used. 
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As an example, assume TI, is less than 19000 dollars, then expression 
((0.15 Jn,2 + Tl,)/2) of (3.12) will be the tax, and the rest of the formula will be zero. 
Note that if Tl, is negative, say -1000, -r.,(TI,) = !o.15(V -10002 -1000) = O. If TI, is 
2 
greater than 19000 but less than 45925, say 20000, the tax would be: 
Tax= O. l S J200002 + 20000 + 0_ 13 V(20000 - 19000)2 + 20000 - 19000 
2 2 
Tax=0.15·20000 +0.13 ·1000 = 3130 
Tax Carry Back 
If the farmer's standard deductions (STD) are more than the income for the year 
(1t1), then there is a net operating loss (NOL) (IRS, publication 536) equal to: 
(3.13) NOL,= -(1t1 -STD); STD>1t1 
The NOL can be used by deducting it from income in another year or years. Assume the 
farmer can only carry back his/her tax losses to the previous year, then the tax losses 
(TXLS) carry back are: 
(3.14) TXLS, = -r.(Tl,_ 1) T/1_ 1 --r.(Tl1_ 1)(Tl1_ 1 -NOL,) 
Assuming the farmer stays in the same income bracket, the tax rate (-r.(Tl,_1)) is the same 
before and after deducting the NOL, then (3.14) becomes:: 
(3.15) TXLS1 = -r.(TJ,_ 1)NOL, 
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Table 3.2. Schedule y-2. Tax Rate Schedule for Married Filling 
Separately (1994) 
If Taxable Income But not Tax Of Amount 
over over-
0 
19000 
45925 
70000 
125000 
Over 
19000 
45925 
70000 
125000 
-----------15. 0% 
2850.00+28.0% 
10389.00+31.0% 
17852.25+36.0% 
37652.25+39.6% 
0 
19000 
45925 
70000 
125000 
Source: IRS. Instructions for Form 1040. 1994 
Notice that the tax schedule in table 3.2 is really a step function that can be represented as: 
(3.11) 
Tax =0.15 Tl/[TI1>0] +0.13 TI/[TI1> 19] + .03 TI/[T/1>45.925] 
+0.05 TI/[TI,>70] +0.036 TI/[TI1> 12.5] 
where numbers are in thousands of dollars, and I[.] is an indicator function equal to one 
when the condition is true, and zero otherwise. To make (3 .11) differentiable, the 
following transformation was made: 
JTI,2 + Tl, l(TJ, -19)2 + TI, -19 Tax=0.15 +0.13~V ______ _ 
2 2 
(3.12) f(TJ, -45.925)2 + TI, -45.925 f(TJ, -70)2 + Tl, -70 +0.03 v +o.o5~v ______ _ 
2 2 
. l(TJ, - 12.5)2 + TI, - I 2.5 
+ 0.036 ..... v _______ _ 
2 
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This is the amount that should be refunded to the farmer and added to net income (NI,) in 
(2.17). 
Reaction Functions 
In this study a two period dynamic model is estimated by computing the 
parameters of a reaction function. Reaction functions enable the decision maker to react 
to information prevailing at the decision time (Venkateswaran and Preckel). Decision 
makers are assumed to make their hedging decisions at the beginning of each production 
period. At decision period 1, the farmer chooses a fixed futures position (F 1). At decision 
period 2, the decision maker has information regarding wealth {W1) realized in period I 
and makes a hedging decision based on this information. Therefore, the reaction functions 
representing the quantity of futures hedging at the beginning of the second period are: 
(3.16) 
F.wheat A W 2 = <X1 + l-'1 1 
F steers _ A W 2 -<X2 + l-'2 l 
For the second period, instead of choosing the quantities of futures contracts (F2), 
decision makers in this study choose the parameters of the reaction functions i.e, a's and 
p's to maximize the present value of terminal wealth. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Simulation results show that the farm's capital structure, bankruptcy and liquidity 
cost, cost of hedging, off-farm income, profitability, cash and futures price variability, 
basis risk, production risk, and marginal tax rates are all factors that affect the decision to 
hedge. 
Debt to Assets Ratio and the Optimal Hedge Ratio 
Results clearly show that decisions at a certain level of income and debt to asset ratio 
depend on whether the farmer is solvent or not and depend on the potential for 
bankruptcy. The model yields optimal hedge ratios for wheat in the range of0.19 to 0.44 
as the debt to assets ratio increases from 0.8 to O respectively (fig. 4.1). However, if 
average profits go up, wheat hedge ratios would increase from a low of0.13 to a high of 
0.31 as the debt to assets ratio increases from 0.15 to 0.8 respectively (fig. 4.2). In figure 
4.2, the probability of having positive liquidity and bankruptcy costs is zero for the entire 
range. For a sample of Kansas farmers with an average debt to assets ratio of 0.4, 
Schroeder and Goodwin find that the average percent of wheat sold using futures hedging 
was 22%. The results in this study predict closely their findings. Hedge ratios for wheat 
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are higher than those for steers since wheat is relatively riskier given that the time between 
planting and harvest for wheat production is longer than the time the steers are owned. 
Results indicate that the farmer would choose to hedge steers only when the probability of 
bankruptcy is positive (figs. 4.1 and 4.3). Bankruptcy is an extreme case since it only 
happens when the debt to assets ratio is higher than 0.85 (fig. 4.3). 
Contrary to what one would expect, the model shows that hedging decreases with 
increasing leverage (fig. 4.1) when the firm has zero probability of going bankrupt 
(fig.4.3). However, the shape of the curve changes with a different level of income 
through the effect of taxes. With an increase in prices by 15% (an average increase in 
profits from $5,043 to $44,283), the profitability of the production of wheat and cattle 
rises, and the firm hedges more as the proportion of debt increases (fig. 4.2). With low 
profitability, the firm pays almost no taxes after deductions and exemptions, which means 
that the tax reduction with increasing hedging is minimal. As profitability increases, the 
firm pays more taxes and has more incentives to hedge. Hedging reduces the variability of 
profits and the expected tax liability which in turn increases the expected ending wealth. 
When the firm's probability of bankruptcy is positive (fig. 4.3), hedging increases 
significantly (from 0.19 to 0.8) (fig. 4.1) to reduce bankruptcy losses. The nonlinearity 
clearly displayed in figure 4.2 is most lik~ly due to the tax schedule, which is a step 
function (table 2.2). The response of hedging to changes in the debt to assets ratio 
increases (the slope of the function is steeper) as the farmer moves up from one income 
bracket to another. 
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Before the firm goes bankrupt, it will first encounter liquidity problems, and 
hedging should serve as a source of cash flow (Turvey and Baker). This is true as long as 
the cost of hedging is lower than the liquidity cost. The liquidity cost in figure 4 .1 is 1 % 
of outstanding short-term liabilities, not high enough for the firm to hedge more. As soon 
as the firm experiences both insolvency and bankruptcy (fig. 4.3) the firm is willing to pay 
the cost of trading more in the futures market ( fig. 4 .1) and reduce the relatively higher 
liquidity and bankruptcy costs. Note that the results hold under the assumption of risk 
neutrality. 
Interest Rates 
As Collins and Karp argue, increases in leverage also increases the probability of a 
disaster which cause increased risk ofloss for the lender, and the cost of borrowing also 
increases with leverage. This relationship is shown in figure 4.4. When the probability of 
bankruptcy is non-zero, the interest rate rises above the riskless interest rate. For this 
simulation example, the firm shows positive probability of bankruptcy at relatively high 
debt to assets ratios (above .85), where the cost of borrowing begins to rise. 
Cost of Hedging 
Traditionally optimal hedging models introduced by Johnson and Stein and 
variations of their approach (i.e., Myers and Thompson) assume away the cost of hedging. 
Here the cost of hedging influences greatly the decision of whether or not to hedge and 
how much to hedge (figs. 4.5 and 4.6). Similar results were obtained by Lenee and 
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Berck. The cost of hedging has to be lower than 15 cents/cwt (the base cost was 25 
cents/cwt) for a cattle producer to hedge. A cattle producer would hedge more than 50% 
of the steers if the cost of hedging is as low as 5 cents/cwt. The cost of hedging alone 
might be the reason why a cattle producer would not hedge at all. For a wheat producer, 
the optimal hedge ratio varies from a high of .52 to O when the cost of hedging increases 
respectively from 1 cent/bu to 28 cents/bu. 
Clearly, transaction costs of hedging may well exceed the tax-reducing benefits of 
hedging, causing optimal hedge ratios to decrease. These results apply for a debt to asset 
ratio of0.61, a point at which the farmer does not encounter any liquidity or bankruptcy 
cost. 
Off-Farm Income and Profitability 
In accordance with Lenee's results, optimal hedge ratios are greatly influenced by 
off-farm income (fig. 4. 7). As off-farm income increases, the tax-reducing benefits of 
hedging become more attractive and the wheat producer would hedge more. This result 
could not be found by Lenee since tax effects were ignored in his study. 
After a level of off-farm income of$20,000 (the average farm income is $6,470), 
the optimal hedge ratio begins to decline. This result may not be due to what Lenee calls 
"the dilution effect." In Lenee's work, as the share of the alternative investment to initial 
wealth increases, the cash position becomes relatively less and less important to the 
farmer, and the incentive to hedge decreases. In this study, though, as income increases, 
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the farmer moves up to a higher income bracket where marginal tax rates are lower and 
the incentive to hedge is little. 
The effect of higher profitability works much the same way as off-farm income 
(fig. 4.8). As the cash position becomes more profitable, benefits from futures trading 
become relatively negligible, making hedging unattractive. With a 25% increase in prices, 
profitability increases to an average of $59,335, a point at which wheat hedging is zero. 
Variance of Cash and Futures Prices 
For a wheat producer, the optimal hedge ratio is positively related to the variance 
of cash and futures prices. As the cash and futures price risk increases ( one at a time), the 
optimal hedge ratio increases. Under the assumptions of production certainty and basis 
risk, Robinson and Barry, Peck, and Kahl and others found the same result. In this study, 
however, results are found under the assumptions of risk neutrality and production risk. 
An increase of either the cash price variance or the futures price variance leads to 
an increase in basis risk, which would be a disincentive to hedge (fig. 4.11). However, the 
increase in the price variance more than offsets the increase in the basis variance, and this 
provides an incentive to hedge more. The zero hedging position for steers did not change 
with variations in the variance of prices. 
Taking the derivative of the minimum-variance hedge ratio in (2.3) with respect to 
the variance of the futures price, one obtains that the minimum-variance hedge ratio 
. h . f h fu . . ( ap• 0 P?f 0) H h increases as t e vanance o t e tures pnce increases -- = --> . owever, t e 
2 4 
aapf apf 
minimum-variance hedge ratio does not depend on the cash price variance. The results in 
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this study confirm partially the predictions by Robinson and Barry (2.12) and the empirical 
findings of Peck and Nahmias where the optimal hedge ratio increases with increases in 
cash price variance. It is shown here, though, that the optimal hedge ratio also increases 
with increases in the futures price variance (not true in Robinson and Barry's model). 
The optimal hedge ratio is more sensitive to changes in cash price variance than it 
is to changes in the futures price variance. The curve is almost flat when the variance of 
futures price reaches 0.30 (a coefficient of variation of 5.28), a point at which the optimal 
hedge ratio starts to fall. Hedging becomes less attractive as the variability of the futures 
price increases. 
Basis Risk 
There is a significant response of hedging to changes in basis variance (figure 
4.11). As basis variance increases, the correlation between futures and cash prices goes 
down, and producers will have less incentive to hedge. Wheat optimal hedge ratios fall 
from a high of O. 3 0 to O. 12 when the correlation of cash and futures decreases from O. 9 to 
0.80. For steers, further decrease in basis risk (from the base model, table 1) would not be 
enough incentive to hedge. The transaction cost of hedging must be too high compared to 
the expected gain from hedging steers. The variance of prices and production risk are held 
constant. 
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Deterministic Production 
When randomness of output was eliminated, the optimal hedge ratio for wheat 
increased from 0.30 to 0.40, a 32.4 % change. A recommended hedge ratio based on 
deterministic output can be suboptimal whenever the firm faces production uncertainty (as 
in most agricultural activities). As predicted by several authors (Chavas and Pope; Grant; 
Rolfo; Lenee; Lapan and Moschini), production risk causes the optimal hedge ratio to be 
lower than in the case when output is nonrandom. Results explain why grain elevators 
find it more attractive to hedge than not to hedge. These firms hold more inventories, 
which have little randomness. 
Progressive Tax Rates and Tax Carry Back 
In this model, taxes play a very important role in the decision to hedge, especially 
when the firm is not close to bankruptcy. A decrease in the marginal tax rate of30% can 
make the optimal hedge ratio for wheat go to zero (Fig. 4.12). On the other hand, an 
increase in the marginal tax rate of 30%, can bring the optimal hedge ratio to a high of 
0.50. The tax reducing benefits of hedging provided the concavity of the objective 
function when the likelihood of positive bankruptcy and liquidity costs is zero. The agent 
need not be risk averse to hedge, instead, he/she hedges to reduce taxes and increase after-
tax income. 
With a low profitability, the changes of having net operating losses (NOP) are 
high. Assuming all these losses could be carried back, the optimal hedge ratio would be 
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zero (fig. 4.13). Even if the farmer was able to carry back only 40% of his/her NOL, the 
optimal hedge ratio would be less than 10%. Tax losses carry back increase income in the 
current period and decrease the variability of income~ therefore, reducing the incentive to 
hedge. 
Two Period Dynamic Model 
Dynamics matters more when income is low. When beginning equity is $150,000 
(debt to assets ratio of0.61), the farmer would hedge 41% and 70% of the wheat in the 
first and second periods respectively (table 4.4). However, when income increases (i.e, 
off-farm income is $50,000), the dynamic optimal hedge ratio is lower and almost the 
same for both periods (0.27 and 0.25 respectively). Steers are still not hedge in the 
dynamic model. 
The optimal hedge ratios for wheat are higher in the dynamic model than the static 
optimal hedge ratios. For example, when beginning equity equals $150,000 and off-farm 
income is $50,000, the dynamic optimal hedge ratio for wheat in the first period is 0.27 
while the static optimal hedge ratio is 0.18 (table 4.3 and 4.4). Similarly, for the case 
where beginning equity is $200,000, the optimal hedge ratio is 0.33 in the static case, and 
0.50 in the dynamic model. As a business activity becomes riskier (i.e, more variability of 
income), more incentives would exist to trade in the futures markets. In the dynamic 
model more uncertainty is introduced. Income in the second period is uncertain not only 
because of price, basis, and yield risk, but because beginning equity is also uncertain 
(depends on first period's outcome). 
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In the static model, the cost of hedging affects significantly the decision to hedge 
and how much to hedge. This response is less dramatic in the dynamic model. A 20% 
increase in the cost of hedging makes the dynamic optimal hedge ratio for wheat in the 
first period drop 32% (from 0.41 to 0.28). The same increase in the cost of hedging 
wheat caused the static optimal hedge ratio to decline by 60%. The benefits of hedging in 
the dynamic model are more obvious and the optimal hedge ratios are relatively less 
responsive to changes in the cost of hedging. Hedging increases expected after tax 
income for the period, and this makes next period's beginning equity increase. 
The slope in the reaction function for wheat is always positive (table 4.4). An 
increase in realized income in the first period would lead to an increase in futures trading 
in the second period. However, the response of dynamic optimal hedge ratios is lower as 
income increases. For example, when off-farm income is zero, the slope in the reaction 
function for wheat is 0.56, but when off-farm income increases to $50,000, the slope is 
0.29. This shows that since marginal tax rates are lower at high income levels, the optimal 
hedge ratio should be less responsive to income changes. 
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Table 4.1. Simulation Results: Debt to Assets Ratio vs. the Optimal Hedge Ratios for Wheat 
and Steers, Probability of Insolvency and Bankruptcy, and Interest Rates. 
Optimal Hedge Ratio Probability (%) of 
Debt to Assets 
Ratio Wheat Steers Bankruptcy Insolvency 
0.00 0.44 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.12 0.37 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.24 0.37 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.36 0.30 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.49 0.33 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.62 0.27 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.75 0.22 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.80 0.23 0.00 0.0 0.0 
0.83 0.24 0.23 0.2 0.2 
0.85 0.47 0.67 0.6 0.8 
0.89 0.88 0.85 1.6 3.0 
Table 4.2. Debt to Assets Ratio vs. Optimal Hedge Ratios 
for Wheat When Prices Go Up by 15% 
Leverage 
0.11 
0.22 
0.34 
0.46 
0.57 
0.69 
0.74 
0.77 
0.79 
0.82 
Optimal Hedge Objective function 
Ratio Value ($1000) 
0.13 394. 786 
0.16 342.003 
0.24 289.174 
0.25 236.406 
0.26 183.786 
0.32 131.124 
0.32 110.049 
0.31 99.504 
0.30 88.960 
0.32 78.412 
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Interest 
Rate 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.085 
0.086 
0.089 
Objective 
Function 
Value ($1000) 
420.000 
366.542 
313.197 
259.786 
206.451 
153.300 
100.108 
79.418 
68.619 
57.512 
45.538 
Table 4.3. Optimal Hedge Ratios vs. Cost of Hedging, Off-Farm Income, 
Price Variance, Basis Risk, Progressive Tax Rates and Tax Loss 
Canyback. 
Optimal Hedge Objective function 
Variable Ratios Value ($1000) 
Cost of hedging Wheat ( $/bu.) 
0.014 0.52 154.60 
0.016 0.42 154.57 
0.018 0.37 154.54 
0.020 0.30 154.52 
0.022 0.22 154.50 
0.024 0.12 154.49 
0.026 0.07 154.48 
0.028 0.00 154.48 
Cost of Hedging Steers ($/lb.) 
0.05 0.57 154.57 
0.10 0.26 154.53 
0.15 0.00 154.52 
Off-Farm Income($) and the Optimal Hedge Ratio for Wheat 
10000 
20000 
30000 
40000 
50000 
0.37 
0.38 
0.36 
0.29 
0.18 
% Increase in Prices vs. the Optimal Hedge Ratio for Wheat 
10 
IS 
20 
25 
0.31 
0.27 
0.16 
0.00 
162.86 
170.82 
178.37 
185.54 
192.39 
175.52 
185.03 
194.03 
202.62 
Variance of Wheat Cash Price vs. the Optimal Hedge Ratio for Wheat 
0.21 
0.24 
0.27 
0.33 
0.36 
0.39 
0.13 
0.20 
0.24 
0.35 
0.38 
0.43 
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154.49 
154.50 
154.51 
154.53 
154.54 
154.55 
Table 4.3 (Continue) 
Variable 
Optimal Hedge 
Ratios 
Objective function 
Value ($1000) 
Variance of Wheat Futures Price vs. the Optimal Hedge Ratio for Wheat 
0.18 
0.20 
0.23 
0.28 
0.30 
0.33 
0.16 
0.21 
0.29 
0.32 
0.33 
0.32 
154.66 
154.61 
154.57 
154.48 
154.44 
154.40 
Basis Variance for Wheat vs. the Optimal Hedge Ratio for Wheat 
0.058 
0.085 
0.113 
0.140 
0.30 
0.21 
0.12 
0.06 
% Change in the Progressive Tax Rates 
-30 
-20 
-10 
10 
20 
30 
% of Tax loss Carry back 
IO 
20 
30 
40 
0.00 
0.11 
0.20 
0.37 
0.41 
0.51 
0.24 
0.21 
0.14 
0.06 
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154.52 
154.49 
154.46 
154.43 
155.00 
154.83 
154.68 
154.38 
154.24 
154.11 
154.43 
154.56 
154.70 
154.83 
Table 4.4. Dynamic Optimal Hedge Ratios for Wheat and Steers vs. Income and 
the Cost of Hedging. 
Simulation 
Parameter 2 3 4 5 6 
Beginning Equity ($1000) 150 150 150 200 200 150 
Off-Farm Income ($1000) 0 20 50 0 50 0 
Increase in the Cost 
of Hedging Wheat (%) 0 0 0 0 0 20 
Optimal Hedge Ratio 
Wheat 
I" period 0.41 0.46 0.27 0.50 0.22 0.28 
2nd period 0.70 0.63 0.25 0.66 0.26 0.57 
Steers 
111 period 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2nd period 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Reaction Functions 
Wheat 
Intercept (a1) -3.84 -6.92 -3.90 -9.23 -5.74 -4.85 
Slope (P 1) 0.56 0.65 0.29 0.66 0.30 0.56 
Steers 
Intercept ( a2) 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Slope (P2) 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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CHAPTERV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Theoretical and empirical models usually find optimal hedge ratios close to one 
while farmers hedge much less. In this study, a new theoretical model of hedging is 
derived. An empirical example is provided to show how changes in assumptions affect the 
optimal level of hedging for a wheat and stocker steer producer. 
Results explain why some firms do not hedge and some hedge more than others. 
Firms with higher expected income would tend to hedge less than a low-income farm. 
Provided expected operating losses are low, a high-levered firm would hedge more than a 
low-levered firm. Profitability ensures that income is positive and the firm can take 
advantage of the tax-reducing benefits of hedging. As profitability increases, though, 
farmers move up to a higher income bracket where marginal tax rates are lower and the 
incentive to hedge is little. The benefits of trading in the futures markets would be more 
significant if the marginal tax rates were higher. If the firm can carry back its net 
operating losses, no motivation for hedging exists. The more tax losses the farmer can 
carry back, the less incentive he/she would have to hedge. For high-income farms, income 
averaging would have a similar effect than the tax-loss carry back. 
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When the probability of insolvency and bankruptcy is positive, the motivation to 
hedge is less tax related. The farmer is willing to bear the cost of hedging to reduce the 
relatively higher liquidity and bankruptcy costs. Hedging decreases the variability of 
profits, reducing expected liquidity and bankruptcy costs, and reducing interest rates 
changed by banks. 
Traditionally, the cost of hedging has been considered small and ignored in most 
studies. Even when the cost of hedging is a small proportion of total cost, farmers may 
have no incentives to hedge when this cost is higher than the reduction in tax payments 
and the firm is in good financial position (i.e. low debt to assets ratios). For high levered 
firms, hedging reduces expected bankruptcy losses, and this effect may be considerably 
greater than the cost of hedging, making hedging very attractive. The benefits of hedging 
in the dynamic model are more obvious and the optimal hedge ratios are relatively less 
responsive to changes in the cost of hedging. Hedging increases expected after tax 
income for the period, and this makes next period's beginning equity increase. 
Price, basis and production risk also explain differences in hedging behavior 
among farmers. The more variable the cash and the futures prices are the more the 
farmer would hedge. Hedging, however, becomes less and less effective in reducing 
profit variability as basis risk increases. With high basis variance, the optimal decision 
may well be not to hedge at all. As previous research has shown, firms with little 
production uncertainty would hedge less than firms with high yield variability. A grain 
elevator would hedge more than a farmer. Grain elevators hold more inventories which 
have little randomness while farmers are exposed to unexpected weather conditions and 
59 
therefore to higher production risk. Also, it is likely that grain elevators have lower 
transaction costs and would hedge more. 
The optimal hedge ratios for wheat are higher in the dynamic model than the static 
optimal hedge ratios. As a business activity becomes riskier (i.e, more variability of 
income), more incentives would exist to trade in the futures markets. In the dynamic 
model more uncertainty is introduced. Income in the second period is uncertain not only 
because of price, basis, and yield risk, but because beginning equity is also uncertain 
(depends on first period's outcome). 
A major implication of the results in this study is that risk-averse preferences are 
not necessary for farmers to hedge. Tax rates, liquidity costs and bankruptcy losses 
provide the concavity of the objective function necessary to motivate firms to hedge. Risk 
aversion might provide an extra incentive to hedge. 
The empirical example shows that a farmer would hedge some of the wheat and 
would not hedge steers. The optimal hedge _ratio for wheat with a debt to assets ratio of 
0.45 was 0.25 (for an average profit of $48,000). These results are similar to the findings 
of Shroeder and Goodwin. They found that for a Saijlple of Kansas farmers, the average 
percent of wheat sold using the futures markets was 22% (debt to assets ratio of0.4). In 
the example provided, the optimal hedge ratio for steers was zero probably because the 
steers are owned for a short period while the time from planting to harvesting the wheat is 
longer. The potential to reduce risk using wheat futures hedging is presumably higher. 
With empirical research usually finding optimal hedge ratios close to one, some 
believe farmers should be taught the benefits of trading in the futures markets. The new 
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theoretical model provides optimal hedge ratios close to those used by farmers and 
provides an explanation of why farmer would hedge so little. Decisions at a certain 
income level depend on whether the farmer is solvent or not and depend on the potential 
for bankruptcy. Extension economists should not treat every farmer the same and give 
them the same hedging recommendations. Depending on the type of business, product 
diversification, income level, cost of hedging, off-farm income, price, basis and production 
risk, the optimal strategy might be not to hedge or to hedge very little. The most 
important motivation for hedging is the progressive tax rate and some policy implications 
are suggested. Progressive tax rates introduce costs inefficiencies by motivating farmers 
to hedge more. A government official should favor a flatter tax schedule to reduce 
inefficiencies in the market while futures exchange should favor progressive tax rates. 
Tax loss carry back, on the other hand, can eliminate the need for hedging when the firm 
experiences net operating losses. Similarly, for a high-income farm, income averaging 
would make farmers hedge less. It is possible that accounting tricks might balance income 
more cheaply than hedging. For example, if expected income for the year is high, farmers 
may chose to buy inputs for next year before taxes are filed. 
Theoretical and empirical model used in past research have made simplifying 
assumptions that restrict them from explaining what farmers actually do. Future research 
on hedging should no longer ignore the following factors that affect significantly the 
decision of whether or not to hedge and how much to hedge: i) the farmer's income level 
and leverage, ii) the profitability of the cash position and off-farm income, iii) the 
transaction cost of hedging, iv) solvency and probability of bankruptcy, v) price, basis and 
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production risk, and vi) marginal tax rates and tax loss carry back. Assuming away any of 
these factors when true would yield suboptimal recommendations. 
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